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We compare the pre- and post-2010 Hungarian political regimes through the lens of pension poli-
cies. We label the pre-2010 regime as democratic populist because it was characterized by fi scally 
irresponsible policies, yet it maintained the system of checks and balances and the rule of law. In 
contrast, we call the post-2010 regime authoritarian populist as it has employed authoritarian politi-
cal techniques while maintained popular legitimation through regular elections. To substantiate the 
difference between the two periods from an economic viewpoint, we compare pre- and post-2010 
pension policies to fi nd important differences as well as surprising similarities. In particular, we 
analysed the following fi ve policy aspects: (a) reform and partial privatization of the government-
run pension system, (b) policies on the statutory (normal) and the effective (average) pension age, 
(c) indexation, (d) progression in benefi ts calculations and progressivity in the personal income tax, 
and (e) contribution rates. Based on ideological preferences, we argue that one would expect the 
pension system to become fi nancially more sustainable but less redistributive after 2010 in compar-
ison to the preceding period. Yet, we fi nd that although pro-poor redistribution through the pension 
system has indeed been curtailed, fi scal sustainability has not improved due to the erratic policies. 
Keywords: public pension systems, private pension systems, pension policy, authoritarian pop-
ulism, democratic populism, Hungary
JEL classifi cation indices: H55, J26, P16, P48
* An earlier version of this paper appeared in the discussion paper series of the Institute of Eco-
nomics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences as MT-DP 
– 2017/31.
 We express our gratitude to Róbert Iván Gál, Gábor Oblath and Péter Tölgyessy for their con-
structive remarks on previous versions of this paper, as well as to the participants of the 3rd Confer-
ence on the Role of the State in Varieties of Capitalism at the Institute of World Economics of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Center for EU Neighborhood Studies of Central European 
University (Budapest, Nov. 30 – Dec. 1, 2017). Of course, none of them is responsible for any 
remaining errors.
Zoltán Ádám, corresponding author. Lecturer, Corvinus University of Budapest, Faculty of Eco-
nomics, Department of Comparative and Institutional Economics, Hungary. 
E-mail: zoltan.adam@uni-corvinus.hu 
András Simonovits, research fellow emeritus, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economics and 
Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary and Budapest University of 
Technology. E-mail: simonovits.andras@krtk.mta.hu
334 ZOLTÁN ÁDÁM – ANDRÁS SIMONOVITS
Acta Oeconomica 69 (2019)
1. INTRODUCTION
A great number of papers have been published on the Hungarian pension sys-
tem, mostly on its structural reform (partial privatization) started in 1998 (e.g. 
Simonovits 1999; Augusztinovics et al. 2002; Gál et al. 2008; Guardiancich 2008; 
Holtzer 2010). But the post-2010 developments have not received sufficient at-
tention and that little investigation is also concentrated on the renationalization 
of the mandatory private pillar (e.g. Simonovits 2011; Szikra 2014). The present 
paper discusses policies between 1998 and 2017 from a particular political eco-
nomic context. Our primary interest is to analyze and interpret the difference 
between the periods of liberal democracy and autocracy in Hungary in terms of 
pension policies. 
The dividing line between the two periods is 2010, the landslide electoral 
victory of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party that brought an authoritarian populist re-
gime (Kornai 2015). The term ‘authoritarian populist’ here refers to a political 
regime in which a popularly elected government adopts a majoritarian approach 
to power, and creates a situation in which its opposition becomes systematically 
disadvantaged by formal and informal political institutions. Elections continue 
to be held, but there is a limited chance for a peaceful takeover of power by 
any contender. Control over public resources is highly centralized, while control 
over private resources is politically influenced. Extensive clienteles are built, and 
autonomies of non-governmental actors are constrained (Kornai 2016; Magyar 
2016; Müller 2016; Magyar – Vásárhelyi 2017). Orbán, himself, calls this regime 
‘illiberal democracy’.
This was not the situation before 2010, when Hungary had a liberal democratic 
regime, in which the peaceful takeover of power took place at least four times 
between 1990 and 2010.1 Yet, populism also played an important role pre-2010, 
too: continuing the tradition of János Kádár’s communist regime2, when econom-
ic populism was used to buy votes and pacify those who were suffering losses 
as a consequence of government policies (Benczes 2011). In this paper, we put 
authoritarian against democratic populism, and seek to demonstrate the differ-
ence between them by examining their respective pension policies. By doing this 
the paper contributes to the literature on contemporary populism (Mudde 2004; 
Finchelstein 2014; Kriesi – Pappas 2015; Müller 2016; Brubaker 2017; Mudde 
1  Elections in 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2010 brought opposition parties into power. Only once, in 
2006, was the incumbent government reelected.
2  János Kádár was the First, then the General Secretary of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Work-
ers’ Party in 1956–1988.
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– Kaltwasser 2017) and help situate its subject into the empirically examined 
socio-economic trends.
Pension policies are an ideal subject of political economic analysis as they 
concern a large part of the electorate. Pension systems are delicate long-term 
constructions, whose reforms need a lot of political and professional ingenuity 
(Barr – Diamond 2008). Moreover, in most of the developed world, and espe-
cially in the EU11 countries3, including Hungary, the future of the pension system 
is rather dark (Domonkos – Simonovits 2017). Raising of the statutory (normal) 
retirement age can dampen the impact of rising life time expectancy, but low 
fertility rates and excessive pension hikes, especially for previous high earners, 
undermine sustainability. According to various studies, the balance of the Hun-
garian pension system may turn into negative or very negative in the coming dec-
ades, especially from 2035 (e.g. Bajkó et al. 2015 and Freudenberg et al. 2016, 
respectively), while other studies assert sustainability (Dekkers et al. 2015). In 
any case, rising emigration from Hungary and the lack of significant immigration 
into Hungary may place a heavy extra burden on the Hungarian pension system 
in the foreseeable future.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we present 
our argument and hypothesis. In Section 3, we outline the pension policies of 
the period of democratic populism from the introduction of the three-pillar pen-
sion system in 1998 until the two-third electoral victory of Fidesz party in 2010. 
Section 4 discusses the pension policies of authoritarian populism: the period 
characterized by the elimination of checks and balances on government authority 
and the establishment of a manifestly illiberal political regime after 2010. Sec-
tion 5 provides a comparison of results for the pre- and post-2010 periods and 
draws conclusions. In addition, an Appendix presents the indexation of pensions 
between 1993 and 2016.
2. OUR ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES: DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN 
DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN POPULISMS
In 1998, Hungary experienced another replacement of a democratically elected 
government for the second time in a row. It appeared that democracy as a form of 
governance had been institutionalized. Hungary was set to join the NATO (1999) 
and the EU (2004). However, a comparatively low employment rate and a pattern 
of dual-economy development exposed economic policy making to democratic 
3  EU11 is the group of ex-communist EU Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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populism. By this we mean that economic policies sheltered large sections of 
population from market forces, typically associated with large social transfers 
for pensioners and other politically influential, economically inactive or vulner-
able parts of society. Such a political pattern is often associated with clientele 
building as public resources tend to be distributed along political affiliations. 
Democratic populism also creates political cycles in fiscal spending as budgetary 
transfers, which are considered to be primary means to ensure political support 
that becomes especially intensive before elections. Hence, fiscal sustainability is 
typically a key issue of democratic populism, fitting the pattern of unsustainable 
macroeconomic cycles, described by Dornbusch – Edwards (1989) and Sachs 
(1989) decades ago in the context of the post-authoritarian Latin America. As 
democratic populists serve the demand of their core electorate, they can hardly 
afford politically to cut social transfers, including pensions. 
Hungary was one of the most salient cases exhibiting populist economic poli-
cies before 2010 in the EU11. When general government revenues in percentage 
of GDP declined from 47% in 1995 to 42% in 2005 (then increasing), expendi-
tures jumped above 50% in 2002, and had kept hovering around at that level until 
2016. As a consequence, large fiscal deficits had been created in both the 1990s 
and the 2000s, following a political cycle until post-2006 elections when consoli-
dation was not any more avoidable. Meanwhile, public and foreign debts grew 
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Graph 1. General government consolidated gross debt in per cent of GDP in four countries
Source: Eurostat.
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considerably, making Hungary one of the most vulnerable countries to the global 
financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Graphs 1-2)4.
Budgetary overspending was a reaction to the long-standing political demand 
of the electorate, inherited from the pre-democratic period, in which political 
conflict was mitigated by compensating losers of public policies (Kornai 1996b). 
Liberal reformers and international financial institutions, including the IMF and 
the World Bank, in response, advocated a reform of public services, including 
pensions. ‘Structural reforms’ in this context were meant to make governments 
more autonomous from political pressure, and help to attain more balanced fiscal 
positions in the long run. In the pre-2010 democratic populist Hungary, reforms 
and budgetary overspending complemented each other, and created political cy-
cles in both fiscal policy and structural reforms. One of the most salient cases of 
structural reforms was the pension reform of 1997–1998, generating high hopes 
and delivering poor results in terms of sustainability (Simonovits 1999, 2011; 
Guardiancich 2008), to which we will return in Section 3. 
An alternative response to the political trap of budgetary overspending is 
autho ritarian populism. This can be introduced with or without structural re-
forms: the strategy is to redistribute to the benefit of the (higher) middle classes 
and to constrain effective political choice so that opposition and socially cost-
4  For a better clarity we illustrate the changes only for Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
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ly policy measures can be paralyzed. This is the typical political response of 
post-democratic governance in crisis-ridden societies, in which transaction costs 
of democratic political exchange become too high to bear in the face of dimin-
ished expected social utilities. Authoritarian populism can be conceptualized as 
an alternative to democratic populism as it serves popular political demand by 
employing authoritarian political techniques, centralizing political control, or-
ganizing key societal actors into government sponsored vertical clienteles, and 
redistributing to their benefits (Ádám 2018).
Essentially, this is what happened in the post-2010 Hungary, when the cen-
tre-right Fidesz party altered the entire constitutional system, resulting in the 
abolishment of effective checks and balances on government power (Tóth 2011; 
Bozóki 2015; Kornai 2015; Vörös 2015; Halmai 2017). Budget deficits became 
substantially smaller due to the elimination of the fiscally costly pension reform 
of 1998, levying special taxes on banks and other multinational-dominated indus-
tries, a hike in VAT, and an effective cut in family and childcare allowances. In 
sum, spending on social protection and general public services decreased, where-
as budgetary spending with an economic function5 in per cent of GDP – a key 
vehicle on clientele building – increased after 2010.
To be sure, the crisis of liberal democracy is a global issue. From Poland to 
the United States, from Venezuela to Turkey, from Austria and France to Indo-
nesia and the Philippines, the authoritarian populists have come to the fore, of-
fering simple solutions to complex problems and uncertainties (Müller 2016). 
This paper, however, is devoted to a single case: Hungary. To substantiate our 
argument on the difference between democratic and authoritarian populisms, we 
compare pension policies employed in the pre- and post-2010 Hungary. Our anal-
ysis concentrates on five dimensions of the Hungarian pension system: (a) The 
creation and subsequent nationalization of the mandatory private pillar (1998–
2011); (b) The tension between raising statutory retirement age and stagnating 
effective retirement age (i.e. the lack of strong reduction of benefits for early 
retirement until 2009, Females40 and of the elimination of early retirement af-
ter 2010); (c) The erratic practice of pension indexation during the entire period 
together with the introduction and the elimination of the 13th month pensions in 
2002–2009; (d) Income redistribution through pensions; (e) The arbitrary rise and 
reduction of contribution rates.
In our hypotheses, we expected the pre-2010 pension policies (i) to enhance 
(or at least not to constrain) the scope of individual choices, (ii) to struggle with 
raising effective retirement age and punishing early retirement, (iii) to index pen-
sions according to the electoral needs, (iv) to redistribute income through pen-
5 Items in 04 – Economic affairs in Eurostat’s COFOG classification. 
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sions to the benefit of the relatively poor, and (v) to decrease contribution rates to 
the detriment of fiscal sustainability. In turn, we expected the post-2010 pension 
policies (i) to constrain individual choices, (ii) raising effective retirement age 
and punishing early retirement with little political problem if needed, (iii) to pro-
vide a degree of stability and predictability in indexation, (iv) not to use pensions 
to redistribute income to the poor, and (v) not to have much political problems 
with decreasing contribution rates to obfuscate the public. 
3. THE PERIOD OF DEMOCRATIC POPULISM: 
PENSION POLICIES IN 1998–2010
Between 1989 and 2001, Hungary was a front-runner of economic transition. It 
was among the first post-communist countries to liberalize foreign trade, invite 
foreign direct investment, privatize strategic industries, and to harden the soft 
budget constraint of the corporate sector (Kornai 1995; EBRD 1999). It was also 
the first country in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to create a three-pillar pen-
sion system in 1998, following the advice of the World Bank (1994).
The reform was introduced after the success of the macro-stabilization of 
1995–1996 (Kornai 1996b). It was a swift political process by a coalition of the 
socialist and the liberal parties, ignoring the critics and opposition, both political 
and professional. The reform was pushed through parliament in 1997 and was 
introduced in 1998, a few months before the general elections. Although it was 
politically popular, the parties of the opposition never subscribed to it, and they 
started undermining the three-pillar pension system as soon as they assumed of-
fice in the Summer of 1998. 
The Hungarian version of democratic populism had been characterized by re-
curring budget deficits and unsustainable fiscal trajectories. A major reason for 
this was the pressure to maintain fiscal transfers towards politically important 
groups, such as pensioners. The goal of the pension reform from a political eco-
nomic perspective was to cut this dynamics by creating private incentives to ac-
cumulate long-term savings, and to enforce efficiency criteria on private pension 
funds. In actual terms, however, no efficient market for long-term savings was 
produced and the operation of private pension funds was characterized by exces-
sive costs. Other aspects of the pre-2010 pension system were a low and only 
slowly upward-adjusting effective pension age, erratic changes in indexation, the 
unsustainable provision of the so-called 13th month pension in 2003–2009, and 
considerable pro-poor redistribution. 
340 ZOLTÁN ÁDÁM – ANDRÁS SIMONOVITS
Acta Oeconomica 69 (2019)
3.1. Partial privatization
The Hungarian mandatory private pension system was created in a very short 
period of time in 1997–1998. This was a classic three-pillar system advocated 
by the World Bank and other experts globally during the privatization frenzy of 
the 1990s. The three pillars were as follows: (i) a traditional pay-as-you go pillar, 
operated by the government-run social security system, (ii) a mandatory private 
pillar, introduced in 1998, and (iii) a voluntary private pillar that had actually 
existed since 1993, but remained small and structurally insignificant, and thus we 
shall neglect it in our discussion. 
Hence, effectively, until 1998, Hungary had a purely unfunded (monopillar) 
public pension system. This was a strongly progressive system (Augusztinovics – 
Martos 1996), especially, if we take into account that the personal income tax was 
also quite progressive. Since then, the impact of the number of contribution years 
remains progressive.
Importantly, in the context of the 1998 reform, the remaining public pillar 
was set to be transformed into a defined contribution (DC) system, in which the 
formerly loose link between contributions and benefits were to be transformed 
into a strong one, but the actual benefits were to be still paid out from current rev-
enues. At the start, about half of the workers entered voluntarily into the mixed 
system; and by 2010 another quarter of the workers (those entering the labour 
force between 1998 and 2010) had to join but a large share of them would have 
also joined voluntarily. 
Since the cost of transition to this mixed system was financed from public debt, 
the budget deficit was much higher and the government debt rose much faster 
than it would have been without this structural reform (Drahokoupil – Domonkos 
2012; Casey 2014). Though it is impossible to separate out the impact of various 
public policies on debt dynamics, the fact is that the government debt ratio rose 
from 52% (at the end of 2001) to 66% (at the end of 2007) to continue to 80% (at 
the end of 2010). The third figure already contains the steep depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate and increased foreign exchange reserves in the context of 
the EU-IMF-World Bank financing package obtained in November 2008.
3.2. Statutory versus effective retirement age
A key issue of any pension system is the dependence of the annual benefit on the 
retirement age. A sensible system emulates a private saving scheme: the longer one 
accumulates her own annual contribution, the more virtual capital is accumulated, 
and the fewer parts it should be divided into (because she lives fewer inactive years). 
COMPARING PRE- AND POST-2010 HUNGARIAN PENSION POLICIES 341
Acta Oeconomica 69 (2019)
Traditionally, in all communist countries, the statutory retirement age was relatively 
low: 55 for women and 60 for man. (Life expectancy, especially for males, was also 
low prior to 1989 mainly due to high mortality between age 20 and 40.) 
When full employment collapsed during the transition and open inflation ap-
peared, the out-dated pension system had to be modernized. Life expectancy also 
started to rise from the early 1990s. As a natural reaction, in 1996, statutory re-
tirement age was raised to 62 by 2001 and 2009 for males and females, respec-
tively. Due to the exaggerated fear of mass unemployment, however, subsequent 
governments maintained the possibility to obtain disability pensions easily. Fur-
thermore, the benefit reduction for early retirement remained very modest, es-
pecially for those who had a relatively long period of contribution (Vanhuysse 
2006). It is small wonder that in spite of the rising statutory retirement age, the 
effective retirement age hardly rose. 
Another problem appeared with respect to fragmented careers (Augusztinovics 
– Köllő 2009; Dekkers et al. 2015). To measure the weak link between the retire-
ment age and the length of contribution, Granseth et al. (2016) used  a relatively 
simple indicator, namely the correlation between retirement age and the length of 
contributions. This indicator becomes positive in well-designed pension systems 
(e.g. Sweden), while it is negative in poorly designed systems (e.g. Hungary).
When the Great Recession arrived in 2008, the centre-left Hungarian govern-
ment sought to strengthen the sustainability of the pension system by raising the 
statutory retirement age from 62 to 65 by 2022, and allow early retirement only 
with sensible reductions. 
Table 1 displays the outcomes for the period of 2006–2010. In 2007, 101% 
of males of the cohort size retired (50,900/50,300), while in 2008, only 54% 
(25,700/47,400) retired. The reason was simple: males (and females) wanted to 
avoid the sudden decrease of 8% in the initial pensions announced for 2008. 
(This was part of the post-2006 fiscal stabilization efforts that preceded the can-
cellation of the 13th month pension in 2009.) 
Table 1. Retirement ages and relative sizes: males and females, 2006–2010
Year
Males Females 
Average retirement
age (year)
Relative
size
Average retirement
age (year)
Relative
size
2006 59.9 0.638 57.5 0.758
2007 59.7 1.012 57.8 1.028
2008 59.8 0.542 57.3 0.611
2009 59.7 0.727 59.9 0.239
2010 60.2 0.676 60.7 0.198
Source: Fazekas – Varga (2015: 262, Table 11.5)
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3.3. Indexation and extra benefi ts
In modern economies, public pensions in progress are indexed, i.e. each year their 
nominal values are increased in a prescribed way. There are two pure types of in-
dexation: every year the pension benefits increase with the rate of either the wage 
increase or the price increase. There are a number of combinations of the two 
pure types, among which the most widespread one is the 50–50% combination 
that is also known as “Swiss indexation”. In the early years of transition (between 
1989 and 1996), when real wages decreased by cc. 20%, wage indexation was 
used to relieve the pension budget (Table A.1 in Appendix). It has the advantage 
that the relative value of the benefit in progress to the nationwide average wage 
remains invariant to the number of years passed after retirement. 
When the Hungarian GDP and real wages started to increase steadily, policy 
makers realized the burden of preserving wage indexation. They could have in-
troduced price indexation, with the advantage of preserving the real value of the 
benefit in progress when the nationwide average real wage decreases, but they 
carefully chose combined indexation. This way, the general government saved 
a lot: With a given initial pension and a steady annual nationwide average real 
wage increase of 2%, the wage indexation would have cost by cc. 10% more than 
the combined indexation did. Hence, the combined indexation preserved both the 
relative and the real stability of pensions but in a limited way. In sum, since 1999, 
the Hungarian pension law has prescribed expected indexation; combined wage 
– price indexation until 2009, and pure price indexation since 2010. 
There have always been various tricks to raise or diminish pension benefits 
in Hungary, but a very visible form of rise was the introduction of the so-called 
13th month pensions between 2003 and 2006 by the centre-left government of 
2002–2006. This somewhat counterbalanced the impact of the reduced indexa-
tion introduced in 2000 by the centre-right government, but it also raised the gov-
ernment pension expenditure by 8.3% with respect to the original calculations, 
and upset the balance between the pay-as-you-go and the mandatory private pen-
sion pillars.6 Although the 13th month pension was a popular policy measure, it 
was cancelled altogether in 2009 in the context of the loan agreement Hungary 
made with the EU, the IMF and the World Bank after the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis. In consequence, the 13th month pensions became an experience 
of short lived extraordinary pension hike, whose reintroduction is a recurring 
populist political theme, both on the left and right.
6  Fidesz party promised the introduction of a 14th month pension in their 2006 election mani-
festo, but lost the elections against the Socialists.
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3.4. Redistribution in pensions
Though the bulk of the pensions one receives are pension in progress, every pen-
sion had started as an initial pension. There are two pure types of initial public 
pensions: (i) flat benefits and (ii) defined contribution benefits (for short, DC). 
Both have subtypes: ad (i) whether the benefit depends on the number of years of 
contribution or not; and ad (ii) whether the benefit depends on earnings in all or 
the latest years of employment. In practice, most countries operate a combination 
of the two pure types. 
Hungary has been operating a very complex system, where progress in the 
lifetime average of net wages plays a prominent role, and the initial pension is 
proportional to the average of the valorised net wage of each year between 1988 
(the last year of socialism) and the year of retirement. To avoid superfluous de-
tails, we can approximate the degree of redistribution by a scalar which deter-
mines the share of the flat part in the combination (Disney 2004). For example, 
if we approximate a pension system as the linear combination of the flat and the 
proportional components, then our claim becomes obvious. 
Hungary started the post-communist transition with a doubly progressive pen-
sion formula: (i) the very progressive personal income taxation that made net 
wages a very compressed function of gross wages and (ii) the pensions were a 
very compressed function of net wages. To make the remaining public pillar also 
DC-type by 2013, when the first private life-annuity was planned to be paid out, 
the pension progressivity described in (ii) was practically phased out by 2009. 
(While in 1998, a large part of the new pensions were diminished by this rule; 
in 2009, there were hardly any.) The progressivity of the benefit – contribution 
length schedule was also planned to be replaced by a proportional scale by 2013. 
For example, as a survivor from the early days of public pensions, in 1998 the 
first 20 years of employment still gave 53% of the total benefit out of the total 
80% implied by 40 years of employment, this was planned to be reduced to 40%. 
But in the turmoil of the post-2010 years, it was forgotten.
In sum, the pre-2010 pension system had started off as a strongly progressive 
regime in which considerable redistribution from high earners with long careers 
to low earners with short careers took place through both net wages and pensions. 
As the pension system was reformed and the progressivity of personal income 
taxation was reduced, whereas the remaining public pillar’s defined contribution 
character was to be ensured after the partial privatization in 1998, the degree of 
redistribution was considerably cut back by 2009.
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3.5. Contribution rates
Ideally, expenditures of government-run, mandatory pension and health systems 
are financed from contributions. In well-run countries, other sources of revenues 
may also finance social security expenditures but this requires much stronger 
budgetary discipline as has been the rule in Hungary. Contributions to the two 
parts of the social security system – pensions and public healthcare – are also bro-
ken up into the ones paid by employees and employers. These four rates (pension, 
health / employee, employer) kept changing during the entire period. Because of 
the permanent restructuring of various pensioner categories, it is difficult to keep 
track of all the changes. With the carving out of the mandatory private pillar in 
1998, financed from employee pension contributions, an apparent deficit called 
transition cost arose in the public pension pillar. To have an idea of its size, it is 
important to note that it reached 1.3% of GDP per annum by 2009.
Another issue was the cap on the contribution base. To limit annual pension 
benefits, as in most other countries, in Hungary too, there was a cap on employ-
ees’ contribution base between 1992 and 2012. In 2009, the total amount of the 
above-cap employees’ contribution was less than 2% of the total pension con-
tributions, much lower than the corresponding employers’ contributions – that 
was never capped – amounting to 5%. At the cost of some simplifications, we 
can consider as if this 5% were transferred from the above-cap pensioners to the 
below-cap ones. This is because although employers did pay these above-cap 
contributions to the pension system after their high-earner employees, the latter 
had derived no benefits from them. Hence, the employer’s contributions had also 
delivered some degree of solidarity in the pre-2010 pension system.
4. THE PERIOD OF AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM: 
PENSION POLICIES IN 2010–2017
Gaining 53% of the votes given to party lists, the centre-right Fidesz party ob-
tained 68% of the parliamentary seats at the 2010 elections due to the highly 
distortionary Hungarian election system. With its two-third majority, Fidesz was 
able to change the entire constitutional system. It did so systematically, eliminat-
ing all meaningful checks and balances on government power, including the ef-
fective independence of the Constitutional Court, subordinating the public media, 
and exercising explicit political influence on private media outlets. The relative 
independence of government agencies was effectively suspended by appointing 
loyal friends, often for unprecedentedly long tenures. Professional ethos of civil 
servants got destroyed by the new legislation making hiring and firing a discre-
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tionary right of the political appointees. Election rules were changed to the ben-
efit of Fidesz, while public funds have been heavily used in clientele building and 
to conduct permanent political campaigns (Bozóki 2015; Kornai 2015; Freedom 
House 2016).
Democratic populism was associated with unsustainable economic policies, 
but it did not seek to constrain political competition. Generally, it respected the 
rule of law, and usage of public funds for private political means, although exist-
ed, was much more modest than after 2010. In contrast, since 2010, authoritarian 
populism has dismantled the rule of law and created a new highly centralized sys-
tem of resource allocation that still provides fiscal transfers to politically impor-
tant social groups, such as pensioners, along with large scale government-created 
rents enjoyed by the members of the business clientele (CRCB 2016). 
Now the question is whether we can differentiate between democratic and au-
thoritarian populisms at the policy level, with particular reference to the pen-
sion policies. Having presented the pension policies in the period of democratic 
populism in 1998–2010, now we turn to the post-2010 period of authoritarian 
populism, once again touching upon the five dimensions of pension policy we 
discussed in Section 3.
4.1. Renationalization
When the newly elected prime minister, Viktor Orbán flew to Brussels in May 
2010, he first tried to convince the European Commission to open the door to 
relaxing the budget. When this request was denied, the new government had only 
days to work out a new economic program. After some trials, as the simplest solu-
tion to enlarge its manoeuvring room, in late 2010 the government renationalized 
the mandatory private pillar. During their existence, the private pension funds 
worked with so high cost (World Bank 2006; Guardiancich 2008) that there was 
practically no political opposition to their closure (Simonovits 2011). As a result, 
the annual budget deficit-to-GDP ratio immediately dropped by 1.3% and the 
nationalization of assets of the mandatory private pillar opened a room to the re-
duction of public debt by about 10% of GDP.
The government dared not to simply close down the mandatory private pillar, 
rather, a new law was enacted which offered two options: either (i) a member 
returns to the monopillar and can cash in the positive real yields accumulated 
on his/her account (on average, amounting to a modest 7% of the capital) or (ii) 
he/she stays in the private pillar, and after a one-year break, can restart his/her 
employee’s contributions (of 10% of his/her gross wages) to the private account 
but his/her future employer’s contribution (of 24% of the gross wage) stops in-
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creasing his/her prospective public benefit. As a result, 97% of the members of 
the mandatory private pillar returned to the monopillar system. 
The remaining 3% of the erstwhile members (holding 10% of the original total 
capital) successfully resisted the government and, within a year, the parliament 
adopted a new legislation. Therefore, the remaining members were not allowed 
to restart contribution to their private accounts but their entire contribution (34% 
of the gross wages, paid by employees and employers combined) continued to be 
forwarded to the monopillar system and kept earning additional public pension 
rights. (Until now, however, there is only an incomplete law determining the rules 
of paying private benefits at retirement for them.) 
Opposition parties claimed that the government stole people’s savings accu-
mulated on their private pension accounts. Being afraid of an economic collapse 
and/or the nationalization of bank accounts, many Hungarian citizens transferred 
their ordinary private savings into foreign bank accounts. Meanwhile in its Con-
vergence Report 2018–2021, the government claimed that by closing down the 
mandatory private pension pillar, it diminished and keeps diminishing the gov-
ernment debt. However, as if the Report’s authors have not heard about the trans-
formation of explicit into implicit debt, no mention on the rise in implicit public 
debt (as a result of growing benefit claims) can be found in the Report.
At the end of this Subsection, we cite four numbers on the share of the public 
pension system in proportion to GDP in 2011. With expenditures on pensions 
at 10.8% of GDP, Hungary fell between the minimal Lithuanian (7.6%) and the 
maximal Polish (11.3%) ones within the EU11 (post-communist countries that 
have joined the EU), and all these three countries are well below the EU28 aver-
age (12.6%) (Domonkos – Simonovits 2017, Table 2). It is also noteworthy that 
by transferring disability pensions from the public pension system to another 
category, frontline pension expenditures were cut to 9.4% of GDP in 2012. These 
unusual measures have contributed to hiding the real problems of the Hungarian 
pension system.
4.2. Females40 & rigid retirement age 
In its election program of 2010, Fidesz made a promise that women who have 
accumulated at least 40 years of rights before reaching the statutory retirement 
age will be allowed to retire with full benefit (Females40). While the initial pen-
sion benefit still depends on the number of years of contributions, and the years 
spent in vocational school or in higher education (before 1998) are counted as the 
contribution period, the years of rights exclude them. These qualifications did not 
work out, probably because a lot of employees study on a part-time basis in vo-
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cational schools or higher education besides work. As a result, since the introduc-
tion of Females40 in 2011, more than 50–70% of the newly retired females have 
been using this exit route, with the actual average retirement age much below the 
steeply rising statutory retirement age. 
Perhaps as a countermeasure, since 2012 no other early retirement has been 
allowed, not even with actuarially fair benefit reduction. The channels of disabil-
ity retirement were significantly narrowed down as well, raising concerns with 
respect to the dignity of beneficiaries (Szikra – Kiss 2017). The publicly available 
statistics of the Hungarian Pension Office – ONYF  – (2012–2016) as well as the 
analyzis of Czeglédi et al. (2017) demonstrate the inefficiency and inequity re-
sulting from the introduction of Females40 and the elimination of the possibility 
of early retirement. 
By staying content with the simplest numerical calculations, we compare two 
women in 2016: One acquired 40 years of rights and retired at the age of 58 with 
full benefit, i.e. 80% of her valorised average net wage. The other woman wants 
to retire at age 62.5 with 39 years of rights but she cannot because, from 2016, 
the statutory retirement age is 63 years. In a sensible flexible pension system, the 
government would deduct 5.5x6 = 33% of the full benefit from the first woman, 
i.e. she would receive 53.6% of her net wage, while the second woman would 
obtain 0.39x0.02x (1–0.06x0.5) = 75.7% of her net wage. 
With the current steep rise in net value of average real wages, Females40 has 
become a boomerang (Simonovits 2019). To illustrate our point, we replace the 
second woman with a third one, who retired in 2019 rather than 2016. Working 
three years longer, she forsaked three years pension but increased her annual ben-
efit in real terms by 1.074×1.102×1.08×1.075 = 1.374. (1.074, 1.102 and 1.08 are 
the annual real growth factors of the average net wages, while 1.075 is the effect 
of working for 43 rather than 40 years.) As a result, her total benefits in real terms 
rose from 20×100 = 2,000 units to 17×1,374 = 23,360 units! 
It is also worth presenting some data on real outcomes. Table 2 displays the 
characteristics of males, females and Females40 between 2010 and 2014. The 
outcome is chaotic: the relative size of newly retired cohorts developed errati-
cally, whereas the tendency for early female retirement had continued.
4.3. Overindexation and relative devaluation
On the one hand, pensions were considerably over-indexed in 2013–2016 with 
respect to the law (Table A.1 in Appendix). Anticipating the falling global energy 
prices and delivering a popular policy measure before the 2014 elections, the 
Fidesz government administratively forced a significant household energy price 
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cut on energy retail suppliers. Willy-nilly, these price reductions were left out in 
the official annual consumer price forecast between 2013 and 2016, therefore the 
actual cumulative price increase was by about 8.6% lower than the forecast. This 
way, the price-indexed pensions had increased by 8.4% in real terms, celebrated 
by the government propaganda as the revival of the 13th month pensions. 
Very few experts and politicians have dared to criticize this ‘achievement’, and 
more and more citizens consider the pension expenditure as a free good. Criti-
cal voices only underlined that those who retired later than the process started 
received only a part or zero pension increase. 
It is an example of the arbitrariness of indexation that by the end of 2016 the 
government gave an extra uniform additional benefit amounting to 8% of the 
monthly (i.e. 0.7% of the annual) average pension. In 2017 (2018 was an election 
year!), the government repeated this and also gave a pension bonus.
On the other hand, from 2016, a drastic U-turn happened in the Hungarian 
wage and benefit dynamics. As already mentioned in Subsection 4.2, real wages 
exploded, while the bulk of pensions stagnated in real terms. As a result, the aver-
age replacement rate (the ratio of net pensions to net wages) dropped from 0.668 
to 0.550, relatively devaluing benefits to wages. This process temporarily opens 
room for a drastic reduction of the pension contribution rate, reinforcing the rise 
of the net wages. It is only a question of time, however, when the whole process 
reverses itself (Simonovits 2018).
4.4. Polarization of initial pensions
As mentioned in Subsection 3.4, until 2010, the personal income tax was rather 
progressive with significant earned income tax credit (diminishing the lowest-
earners’ personal income tax obligations) and two marginal tax rates around 20% 
Table 2. Retirement ages and relative sizes: males, females and Females40, 2010–2014
Year
Males Females Females40
Average 
retirement
age (year)
Relative
size
Average 
retirement
age (year)
Relative
size
Average 
retirement
age (year)
Relative
size
2010 60.2 0.676 60.7 0.198
2011 60.3 0.753 58.5 1.194 57.6 0.769*
2012 62.0 0.365 59.1 0.727 57.8 0.374
2013 62.2 0.356 59.5 0.544 57.8 0.329
2014 62.2 0.249 59.3 0.484 58.2 0.360
Sources: As Table 1. *Oral communication: The number for Females40 in 2011 also contains those who retired 
earlier but were reclassified in 2011.
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and 40%. Since 2011/2012, it is a proportional (flat rate) income tax, earlier with 
16%, currently with 15% rate. Each year since 2011, low earners have been pay-
ing relatively more tax than before 2011, whereas high earners have been paying 
relatively less tax than before. Consequently, with passing time, the low new 
pensions become lower, and the high new pensions become higher, resulting in 
a considerable polarization of pensions. To give two simple examples: (a) Con-
sider a worker with a minimum wage. He/she has not paid any personal income 
tax between 2003 and 2010, while now he/she pays 15% of his/her gross wage. 
Though the gross nominal minimum wage grew a lot, the corresponding real 
value of the net wage hardly rose between 2010 and 2016. (b) Consider another 
employee, who earns three times the average wage (close to the cap on the em-
ployee’s pension contribution base around 2010). Before the personal income 
tax reform of 2011, he/she paid as a tax cc. 40% of his/her gross wage above the 
average, now he/she pays only 15%.7 
Table 3 reports the wildly diverging relative real household incomes of the 
average, the lowest and the highest deciles in Hungary between 2010 and 2015. 
While the average real income dropped from 100 (2010) to 95.7 (2012), and 
jumped to 109 (2015), the lowest decile’s indicator dropped from 31.8 (2010) to 
27.7 (2012), and only returned to its initial value in 2015. The highest decile’s 
indicator oscillated but eventually grew from 231.1 to 259.9. It is an open ques-
tion how much these numbers are sensitive to the changing degree of tax evasion 
and imperfect observations.
An especially wild form of the pension polarization, connected to the elimi-
nation of the annual cap, is visible even to the ordinary citizen. As the number 
of cap-less years rises, more and more pensioners receive a benefit above the 
7  Note that in Hungary, the pension benefits are calculated from net wages and are exempted 
from personal income taxation.
Table 3. Real incomes: lowest vs. highest deciles, 2010–2015
Year
Average Lowest
10%
Highest
10%
2010 100.0 31.8 231.1
2011 101.2 31.7 234.5
2012   95.7 27.7 228.7
2013   99.1 28.6 242.2
2014 104.1 30.0 250.4
2015 109.0 31.6 259.9
2016 113.2 31.7 270.1
Source: Yearbooks of the Hungarian Statistical Office.
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mythical value of one million forints (cc. 6 times the average net wage or cc. 
8 times the average net pension). 
4.5. Contribution rates
The full version of the present paper (in Tables 5 and 6 of Ádám – Simonovits 
2017) depicted the rounded-off values of the corresponding contribution rates in 
2016 and 2017, respectively. Here, we only report the final data. While the initial 
total contribution rate (pension and health, employer and employee combined, 
in terms of gross wage) of 44% is generally considered very high, international 
comparisons do not support this view (for example, in Slovakia, this figure is 
48%). Confining attention to the total pension contribution rate, note that in a sin-
gle year, it decreased from 32% to 26%. It is easy to see that the radical reduction, 
which was forced through parliament in a rush, only six months after the accept-
ance of the budget for 2017, diminished the first factor of the revenue product to 
(26/32=) 81.25%. To counteract this drop, the second factor, the aggregate wage 
should increase at least to (32/26=) 123.1%. Though the wage growth has been 
quite fast since 2016, and the total pension contribution is only 22.5% since July 
2019, this reduction will ceteris paribus increase the general government deficit, 
and, hence, will prevent from increasing expenditures on other budgetary func-
tions, such as much-neglected health care. (The unexpected delay of the latest 
reduction of 2019 from January to July already signals tensions.)
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have compared pension policies pursued by Hungarian governments in the 
period of democratic populism of 1998–2010, and in the period of authoritarian 
populism of 2010–2017. In the first period, incoherent pension policies were fol-
lowed: the carved-out mandatory private pillar had not delivered the promised 
fruits, the rise in the statutory retirement age was only partially followed by the 
rise in average retirement age, and the partial elimination of redistribution in-
creased high initial pensions, whereas indexation remained haphazard, including 
the introduction and elimination of the 13th month benefits during 2003–2009. 
Hence, our empirical results confirmed our hypotheses with respect to the 1998–
2010 period: the pension policies were erratic and served short-term electoral 
demands without offering long-term solutions for structural problems.
The pension policies of the post-2010 period have a different story. By re-
nationalizing mandatory private pension funds arrogantly, the contributors were 
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intimidated and the spirit of the rule of law weakened. Long-term fiscal sustain-
ability, however, was not improved but – taking into consideration the implicit 
debt towards future pensioners – deteriorated. Effective retirement age has not 
risen sufficiently as a consequence of Females40, even if other options of early 
retirement – irrationally enough – were eliminated. As over-indexation of pen-
sions became a fixture of the government’s pension policy, it would be hard to 
argue that stability and predictability were enhanced with respect to the indexa-
tion either. Moreover, the recent cuts in contribution rates have probably also 
weakened the long-term sustainability of the pension system, contradicting our 
hypothesis of attaining more stable and reliable financial positions through the 
maintenance of contribution rates. In turn, with the elimination of progressive in-
come taxation and of the progression in pensions, pro-poor income redistribution 
through pensions was reduced after 2010, in line with our expectations. 
Nevertheless, neither the elimination of the mandatory private pension funds 
and the resulting short-term windfall revenue in government budget, nor the de-
clining income redistribution through the pension system have been associated 
with improved financial sustainability. Instead, the subordination of society to 
illiberal policies has been carried out, symbolized by the forced nationalization of 
the mandatory private pension funds, demonstrating a limited rule of law and the 
vulnerability of private property to a constitutionally unconstrained government.
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APPENDIX
PENSION INDEXATION BETWEEN 1993 AND 2018
The latest economic history of Hungary is a good illustration of turmoil. Table 
A.1 presents the annual growth rates of GDP (gy), real wages (gw) and real pen-
sions (gb) in Hungary during 1993–2018. We include the replacement ratio as 
well, being the ratio of average benefit to average net wage: βt = bt / vt.  Rather 
than commenting on the quite erratic GDP and real wage dynamics, we confine 
our attention to the even more chaotic pension dynamics. There were three phases 
of indexation in Hungary: wage, combined wage-price and price-indexed as in 
Table A.1. There were years when the indexation rules were followed, for exam-
ple in 1993, 2001 and 2011–2012. As the comments of the last column show, in 
addition to these changes, there were important discretionary measures overwrit-
ing rules, due to the elections (denoted by E), the introduction (2003–2006) and 
elimination (2009–2010) of the 13th month benefits, and the overestimation of 
inflation resulting in over-indexation (2013–2015), respectively. The over-index-
ation in year t is defined as gb–1 in the years of price indexation.
To obtain some statistical indicators, first we report the arithmetic averages of 
the growth factors: 
 E gy=1.021, E gw =1.018 and  E gb =1.019. 
(The more appropriate geometric averages hardly differ: 1.02, 1.017 and 1.018, 
respectively).
Second, we present the standard deviations of the three growth rates, which 
are quite high:
 D gy =0.026, D gw =0.054 and D gb =0.050. 
The standard deviations of the growth rates of real wages and of the real ben-
efits are close to each other and twice that of the output.
Third, we display the correlation coefficients of the three variables:
 ρ(gy, gw) = 0.559, ρ(gw, gb) = 0.879 and ρ(gy, gb) = 0.681.
All the three coefficients are positive and quite strong. The strength of the first 
is weaker than the second, and the third lies between them.
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Table A.1. Output, real wage and real pension dynamics, Hungary, 1993–2018
Year Growth rate Average
replacement rate
Comments
GDP Net wage Pension
Wage indexation
1993  –0.8  – 3.9   –4.6  0.603 
1994    3.1     7.2   –4.7  0.594  E: change in PIT 
1995    1.5  –12.2  –10.1    0.619 change in delay
1996    0.0  –5.0   –7.9  0.593 
1997    3.3    4.9     0.4   0.563 
1998    4.2    3.6     6.2  0.578   E
1999    3.1    2.5     2.1  0.592  
Swiss indexation (half wage + half price)
2000     4.2     1.5     2.6   0.591  
2001     3.8     6.4    6.6   0.591  + raise
2002     4.5   13.6    9.8    0.573  E++ raise
2003     3.8     9.2    8.5   0.568  + 1 week pension 
2004     4.9   –1.1    3.9    0.600  + 2 weeks pension 
2005     4.4     6.3    7.9   0.611  + 3 weeks pension 
2006    3.8     3.6    4.5   0.623  E + 4 weeks pension 
2007    0.4    –4.6  –0.3   0.668  
2008    0.8     0.8    3.4   0.691  
2009  –6.6   –2.3  –5.7   0.672  no 13th month: part 1 
Price indexation
2010    0.7     1.8  –0.9   0.651  E  +  part 2 
2011    1.8     2.4    1.2   0.647  
2012  –1.7   –3.4    0.1    0.670  
2013    1.9     3.1    4.5   0.678  Over-indexation
2014    3.7     3.2    3.2   0.675   E+ over-indexation
2015    2.9     4.3    3.5   0.668  Over-indexation 
2016   2.1     7.4    1.4 0.631 Wage explosion
2017   4.1   10.2    3.0 0.583 Continued
2018*   4.8     8.0    2.0 0.555 Continued
Source: ONYF (2016: Table 1.3, page 16 and new data from public statistics).
Notes: E: elections. Continued: continued introduction of 13th month benefit.
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